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DEFENDERS OF THE CORPORATE
BASTION IN THE REVLON ZONE:
PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v.
TIME INC.
For the past decade, litigation spawned by the unprecedented number of
takeovers and mergers among corporations in the United States has kept
Delaware courts especially busy. Much of the litigation has involved chal-
lenges to actions of the boards of directors of "target" corporations, in suits
by shareholders of the target corporation, or by other corporations seeking
control of the target.' Traditionally, the Delaware courts apply the business
judgment rule when reviewing actions taken by a corporation's board of di-
rectors.2 The business judgment rule holds that a court will not enjoin or set
aside a business decision made by a board of directors as long as an in-
formed, rational basis for the decision can be demonstrated.3 Courts will not
hold directors liable for harm resulting from a decision that the business
judgment rule protects.4 As target corporations devised complex defensive
1. See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840
(Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co.,
496 A.2d 1031 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984);
Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552
A.2d 1227 (Del. 1988); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch.
1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986); In
re Beatrice Cos. Litig., 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199 (Del. Ch. 1986), aff'd men., 522 A.2d 865
(Del. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987).
2. See I E. FOLK, R. WARD & E. WELCH, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL COR-
PORATION LAW § 141.2.2, at 104 (2d ed. 1988); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813
(Del. 1984) ("IT]he business judgment rule operates only in the context of director action....
[I]t has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious
decision, failed to act.").
3. See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCI-
ARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 2-3, 8 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE]. Some authorities speak of a distinction between the business judgment
rule, which protects the decisionmaking process, and the business judgment doctrine, which
protects the decision itself. See Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of
Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 323 n.26 (1987). Delaware courts, however, have
not applied the distinction because the rule and the doctrine operate upon the same principles.
See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180 n.10.
4. Johnson & Siegel, supra note 3, at 311; see also infra notes 39-53 and accompanying
text (discussing the business judgment rule).
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tactics to repel takeovers, 5 however, the Delaware courts altered the business
judgment rule to require a showing by directors that a threat to the corpora-
tion's interests existed.6 The target corporation's board generally considers
takeovers hostile to its interests because a takeover usually results in a loss of
the board's control of the corporation and a subsequent change in corporate
policy.7 To satisfy the business judgment rule in the takeover context, a
board must now prove, in addition to the elements required under the tradi-
tional business judgment rule, that some threat existed.8
Decisions in the Delaware courts during the 1980's explored the bounda-
ries of the business judgment rule in the context of corporate control bat-
tles.9 The problem inherent in corporate control battles is the conflict
between directors' and shareholders' interests. Delaware law charges direc-
tors with a duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.' 0
Although the business judgment rule grants directors wide latitude in their
discretion to make corporate decisions," directors ultimately owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and its shareholders.' 2 Further, the business judg-
5. "A takeover is an attempt by a bidder ('raider') to acquire control of a subject com-
pany ('target') through acquisition of some or all of its outstanding shares." I M. LIITON & E.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 1.0112] (1989). The most common form of
takeover is a bid made directly to shareholders of the target, either in the form of a cash tender
offer or as an offer of raider securities in exchange for target stock. Id.
Defensive tactics evolved as a result of the increase in the use of tender offers as a means to
achieve corporate control. See R. WINTER, M. STUMPF, & G. HAWKINS, SHARK REPEL-
LENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTITIONER 3-4 (Supp.
1989). Federal and state statutes governing tender offers provided the potential target corpora-
tion little protection, so corporations that feared hostile offers began to include deterrent provi-
sions in their charters and bylaws. Id.; see also infra notes 82-84, 87-88 and accompanying text
(discussing examples of deterrent provisions).
6. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see infra notes 54-89
and accompanying text.
7. See Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and
the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1263 (1985).
8. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955; infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); Kleinhandler v. Borgia, [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,525, at 93,324 (Del. Ch. July 7, 1989); TW
Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,334, at 92,173 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,181, at 91,641 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
i1. The business judgment rule allows courts to review only the process by which a board
of directors reaches a decision, not the decision itself. See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 3, at
324 n.29.
12. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). The fiduciary duty includes
both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. Id. at 872-73; see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 2 A.2d 225
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ment rule does not protect any decision tainted by a conflict of interest.' 3
Accordingly, where the business decision concerns control of the corpora-
tion, as in the context of a takeover, resolution of the conflict between direc-
tors' and shareholders' interests turns on how much discretion courts will
allow directors under the business judgment rule.
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., " the Delaware
Supreme Court addressed challenges to actions of the board of directors of
Time Inc. The plaintiffs, Paramount and shareholders of Time, sought an
injunction against a proposed purchase of Warner Communications by
Time.' 5 The plaintiffs alleged that Time's board of directors violated its du-
ties to the shareholders when the board decided to purchase, rather than
merge with, Warner Communications, following a hostile takeover bid for
Time stock by Paramount Communications.' 6 Time's board abandoned its
original plan to merge with Warner in order to avoid a vote by Time's share-
holders.' 7 The board feared that the shareholders would not approve the
merger.' 8
The Paramount court addressed two issues. First, the court assessed
whether the business judgment rule protected the Time board's response to
the Paramount board's tender offer. '9 Second, the court questioned whether
the Time directors' decision to merge with Warner was subject to the busi-
ness judgment rule, or whether Time's board instead had an obligation to
seek the current maximum share value for its shareholders because the pro-
posed transaction could result in a change in control of the corporation.2 °
The Delaware Supreme Court, affirming the court of chancery, upheld
Time's board of directors on both questions.2 ' In so doing, the supreme
court significantly broadened the lower court's decision. In holding that
Time's board satisfied the business judgment rule and that no change in con-
(Del. Ch. 1938), af'd, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (stating that public policy forbids allowing a
corporate director to profit from a breach of fiduciary duty).
13. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984);
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986).
14. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
15. Id. at 1142.
16. Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,265 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), af'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
17. Id. at 93,273-74.
18. Id.
19. Paramount Communications. 571 A.2d at 1142.
20. Id.: see also infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text. Thus, the court considered
whether Time's board was "in the Revlon zone." See infra notes 214-34 and accompanying
text.
21. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1142.
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trol of Time occurred, the court demonstrated a more extensive judicial def-
erence to director discretion than it had in previous decisions.
The Paramount court relied on two earlier Delaware cases in reaching its
decision. The first case, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. )22 established
the duties of directors when faced with a hostile tender offer.23 The second
case, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,24 established a
new "auctioneer" fiduciary duty for directors when the "break-up" of the
corporation becomes "inevitable." 25 Specifically, in Revlon, the court stated
that when a board recognizes that the corporation is for sale, it must seek
"the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company." 26 Based on
the reasoning presented in these two cases, the Paramount court did not hold
Time's directors to the stricter Revlon standard.27
This Note analyzes the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. in light of Unocal, Revlon, and other re-
cent corporate "control" cases. This Note begins by tracing the develop-
ment in case law of the business judgment rule as applied to hostile takeovers
and defensive tactics, and by examining the standards applied by courts
when reviewing directors' decisions in corporate control cases. Next, the
Note examines the Revlon standard and the courts' difficulty in defining the
auctioneer duty. Then, the Note reviews the Delaware Supreme Court's de-
cision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v Time Inc., in light of its prior
Unocal and Revlon decisions. Finally, this Note analyzes the court's ration-
ale in Paramount and concludes that the Delaware Supreme Court's new
expansive reading of director discretion harms shareholders' interests.
22. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
23. See id. at 955; infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
A tender offer generally involves an offer by one corporation to "acquire control of another
corporation by buying its securities or exchanging them for securities of the offeror." I Corp.
Guide (P-H) 2701, at 2702 (Apr. 17, 1990). An aggressor generally uses a tender offer when
target corporation management opposes the aggressor's attempt to gain control of the target.
A corporation may make a self-tender offer to buy back its own shares as a defensive maneuver
to prevent a raider from acquiring control. Id. § 2720a at 2726.
24. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
25. Id. at 182; see infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
26. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
27. See Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (1989).
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I. EVOLUTION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. Traditional Business Judgment Rule Analysis
Corporations, as "creatures of state law,"2 derive their general powers
from charters granted by the states.29 Consequently, state law generally reg-
ulates the actions of corporate boards of directors, including responses to
takeovers.3° Delaware's laws governing corporations assume national im-
portance because more than half of the major publicly owned corporations
in the United States are chartered in Delaware.3
Under Delaware law, directors owe fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to
shareholders and to the corporation.3 2 The duty of loyalty requires directors
"to protect the interests of the corporation and ... to refrain from doing
anything to injure it."3 Courts interpreting this duty of loyalty require that
directors possess "an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation"
34
and forbid conflict between a director's duty and a director's own self-inter-
est. 3 ' The existence of a fiduciary relationship prohibits self-dealing; "[t]he
duty of loyalty is derive[d] from ... [this] prohibition .... Delaware
common law holds that a director's duty of care is breached when a director
acts with gross negligence in making a corporate decision. 37 Directors must
conduct reasonable investigations and make informed decisions.38
28. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
29. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-105 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
30. State law "is the font of corporate directors' powers." Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,
478 (1979). Directors' powers are statutory. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983)
("The business and affairs of a corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.").
Federal law has limited applicability to defensive tactics. See Note, Corporate Auctions and
Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Third Generation Business Judgment Rule, 87 MICH. L. REV.
276, 282 n.31 (1988).
31. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (Indiana law "takes its cue" from Delaware); see
also Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 248 (Feb. 1989) ("Delaware corpo-
rate law ... governs the largest proportion of the largest business transactions in history.").
32. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
33. See W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIREC-
TORS 81 (4th ed. 1988).
34. Id. (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939)).
35. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 33, at 81; see TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisi-
tion Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,173 (Del. Ch. Mar.
2, 1989).
36. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 33, at 82.
37. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 & n.6 (Del. 1984).
38. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
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When stockholders challenge an act of a corporate board of directors, the
business judgment rule protects directors from liability by creating a judicial
presumption that the decision was proper.39 The business judgment rule "is
a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corpora-
tion acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company."'  Courts will
presume that a board of directors has complied with the five elements of the
business judgment rule-a business decision, disinterestedness, due care,
good faith, and no abuse of discretion.4 The business judgment rule permits
courts to review only the decisionmaking process, and not the final decision
of the board,42 thereby ensuring that deference to directors' decisions will
control judicial review of those decisions.
Because the court recognizes a presumption in favor of directors through
the business judgment rule, the challenging party must carry the burden of
proving that the directors violated their duty in some way.43 The burden of
proof shifts, however, if a plaintiff shows that a majority of the directors
have a personal interest in the transaction." As the Delaware Supreme
Court stated in an early case involving review of director discretion, "[t]he
rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation de-
mands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest." 45 Con-
sequently, when the burden of proof shifts to the directors, the directors
must show that the transaction was fair.46 The burden does not shift to
directors merely because their personal ownership interests in the corpora-
tion may benefit more from a transaction than the interests of shareholders
generally.47 To cause the burden of proof to shift to directors, a plaintiff
39. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'don other grounds,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
40. Aronson. 473 A.2d at 812; see Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988); Ivan-
hoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
41. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 12; see Treadway Co. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 3, at 323.
43. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see Note, supra note 30, at 280 n.20.
44. See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 14.
45. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
46. See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 14-15; see also AC Acquisitions
Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("[court's] unwilling-
ness to assess the... [fairness] of business decisions ends when a transaction is one involving a
predominantly interested board with a financial interest in the transaction adverse to the
corporation").
47. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985); Cheff v.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 502, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964).
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must show that a director will "appear on both sides of a transaction [or]
expect to derive... personal financial benefit from [the transaction] in the
sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corpo-
ration or all shareholders generally.""
The rationale for judicial application of the business judgment rule is four-
fold.49 First, by acknowledging that individuals make wrong decisions, but
shielding them from liability for those decisions, the rule encourages quali-
fied persons to accept directorships.50 Second, because decisions that are
intended to be effective and promote corporate interests are inherently risky,
the rule entitles decisionmakers to a degree of discretion."1 Third, the rule
reflects a policy of judicial deference to corporate directors and management,
based on a belief that they are better equipped to make such decisions than
are courts.52 Finally, the rule ensures that corporations are centrally man-
aged, reducing interference from stockholders.5 3
48. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d, 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
49. See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 6-8.
50. See id. at 6. The corporate form provides limited liability for business obligations,
allowing corporate owners to shield personal assets from corporate creditors. This limited
liability is often a motivating factor for business persons choosing to incorporate.
51. Id. Directors, elected by shareholders, have discretion to make unilaterally many cor-
porate decisions, such as whether to declare dividends. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 170 (1983).
See generally id. § 141 (powers of directors). Directors generally must present other decisions,
such as whether to amend articles of incorporation or merge with another corporation, to
shareholders for approval. See, e.g., id. §§ 242(b)(1), 251(c) (1983 & Supp. 1984) (requiring
approval by a majority of the shareholders entitled to vote on the proposal).
52. See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 6-7; see also Johnson & Siegel,
supra note 3, at 323 n.27. The Delaware Chancery Court has stated:
Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, infor-
mation and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts and because there is great
social utility in encouraging the allocation of assets and the evaluation and assump-
tion of economic risk by those with such skill and information, courts have long been
reluctant to second-guess such decisions when they appear to have been made in
good faith.
In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) (quoting
Solash v. Telex Corp., (1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,608 at
97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988)).
53. See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 7-8. One commentator has
stated: "Although it is customary to think of the business judgment rule as protecting direc-
tors from stockholders, it ultimately serves the more important function of protecting stock-
holders from themselves." Id. at 8 (quoting Dooley & Veasey, The Role of the Board in
Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALl Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAW.
503, 522 (Feb. 1989).
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B The "Enhanced" Business Judgment Rule
When the challenged action of directors involves a defensive response to a
takeover attempt, the business judgment rule still applies to judicial review
of that action.54 Delaware courts applying the rule in this context, however,
have "enhanced" directors' duties and given less deference to the decision-
making process." This enhanced duty arises out of the inherent conflict
between shareholders' and directors' interests in a corporate takeover situa-
tion. Directors, confronted with a threat to their control of corporate deci-
sionmaking, face the possibility of losing their jobs if a prospective buyer
accomplishes a takeover. Any measures adopted by a board to preclude the
possibility of a takeover or to thwart the takeover process once it has begun
carry with them the suggestion that directors are acting to entrench their
own positions.5" Such actions conflict with their duty to act in the best inter-
ests of the corporation. Delaware law charges directors with running the
corporation." Consequently, directors must have discretion to make deci-
sions. If Delaware law required directors to remain neutral, thus forcing
shareholders to make corporate decisions, shareholders could face losses
caused by decisions made with a paucity of information about the financial
impact of the takeover. Because of the risk of a conflict of interest in the
takeover context, the enhanced business judgment rule shifts the initial bur-
den of proof to directors.5"
An early Delaware case interpreting the business judgment rule, Cheff v.
Mathes, 9 applied the rule to a board of directors' actions in response to a
threat to its control of corporate policy. In Cheff, shareholders asserted that
directors approved the use of corporate funds to purchase the corporation's
own stock in order to prevent another shareholder from gaining control, and
54. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984). Prior to 1985, courts applied the
traditional business judgment rule to defensive control transactions unless the plaintiffs could
show that the directors' "primary purpose" was to entrench themselves in office. See Note,
supra note 30, at 282 n.30.
55. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). The "en-
hanced" duty calls for "judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred." Id.; see In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders
Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,181, at 91,643 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 30, 1988).
56. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citing Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 21-22, 187 A.2d
405, 409 (1962)).
57. See supra note 30.
58. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal, 493 A.2d at
955.
59. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
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to perpetuate the board's control.' The board believed that the shareholder
was a "raider"'" who wanted to liquidate the corporation or substantially
change corporate policies.62
The court upheld the actions of the directors, stating that the directors
met their burden of "showing reasonable grounds to believe a danger to cor-
porate policy and effectiveness existed" because of the shareholder raider's
stock ownership and his past practices of acquiring and liquidating compa-
nies.6 3 Thus, the directors satisfied their burden of proof "by showing good
faith and reasonable investigation" of the raider's motives."
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,6 5 the issue before the Delaware
Supreme Court was to determine whether directors enacted a selective stock
exchange plan as a defense against a raider's tender offer with a good faith
concern for the corporation, or whether its primary purpose was to perpetu-
ate the directors' terms in office.66 The raider, Mesa, owned 13% of Uno-
cal's stock, and made a two-tier tender offer for Unocal's stock.67 In the
offer's initial stage, Mesa would acquire an additional 37% of Unocal's
shares for $54 per share cash. 68 In the second stage, Mesa would exchange
debt securities (junk bonds) allegedly also worth $54 per share, in exchange
for all remaining shares. 69 Unocal's board, after investigating the offer, de-
termined that the offer was "grossly inadequate."'70 In response, the Unocal
board adopted a plan whereby if Mesa were successful in its first stage, then
Unocal would exchange debt securities worth $72 per share for the remain-
ing 49% of its shares. 7' The Unocal board's exchange plan, however, was
selective because it excluded Mesa from participation. 72 The Unocal board
believed that excluding Mesa was necessary to further its purpose. That pur-
pose was to defeat Mesa's offer or, if Mesa succeeded, to give the 49% share-
holders a senior security interest superior to other corporate obligations.73
The court upheld the directors' approval of the stock plan, holding that, in
60. Id. at 502, 199 A.2d at 553.
61. "Raider" is the term used for an individual or corporation seeking to acquire control
of a target corporation. See I M. L'roN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 5, § 1.01[2].
62. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 499-500, 199 A.2d at 551-52.
63. Id. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
64. Id.
65. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).




70. Id. at 950.
71. Id. at 951.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 956.
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addition to the directors' initial burden of proof of showing that a threat
existed from either a third party or other shareholders, the defensive tactic
used "must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'74 The court found
that the repurchase plan satisfied this test for two reasons: One, because the
raider's two-tier tender offer was considered "inadequate and coercive"'
and, two, because the raider was a well-known "greenmailer," who initiated
takeovers in an attempt to coerce the target corporation to repurchase its
stock at a premium price in order to defeat the takeover.76
Taken together, the Delaware Supreme Court decisions in Cheff and Uno-
cal announce a two-part test for judicial review of directors' actions in the
corporate takeover setting: Directors must show initially that they had "rea-
sonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effective-
ness existed"; 77 then, the directors must show that the action taken in
response to that threat was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."
7 8 If
directors comply with this two-part test, they satisfy the business judgment
rule.79 The burden of proof then shifts to the plaintiffs to show "by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the directors' decisions were primarily based
on perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty
such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed." 80
74. Id. at 955. The court stated that, in conducting an investigation of an offer, directors
must analyze "the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise." Id.
The court provided examples of legitimate threats: "[T]he inadequacy of the price offered,
nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community gener-
ally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of the securities being offered in the ex-
change." Id. (citing Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities:
An Update, ABA NAT'L INST. ON THE DYNAMICS OF CORP. CONTROL 7 (Dec. 8, 1983)).
75. Id. at 958. Unocal's board determined that the debt-financed second stage of Mesa's
offer was actually worth far less than $54. The court noted that "[i]t is now well recognized
that such offers are a classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into tender-
ing at the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the
back end of the transaction." Id. at 956.
76. Id. at 956 & n.13.
77. Id. at 955.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 958.
80. Id. Some commentators have labeled the Unocal standard of review the "proportion-
ality test." See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 248; see also City Capital Assocs. v.
Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.), ("Unocal ... created a new intermediate form of
judicial review to be employed when a transaction is neither self-dealing nor wholly disinter-
ested. That test has been helpfully referred to as the 'proportionality test.' "), appeal dismissed
without opinion, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
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Despite applying the enhanced business judgment rule, courts have upheld
a wide variety of takeover defense tactics."s Generally, such tactics take one
of two forms, financial or structural.8 2 Structural defenses, also known as
"shark repellents," are designed to discourage takeovers. For example, a
"poison pill" provision may give shareholders the right to receive a substan-
tial premium price for stock from a raider when a stated triggering event
occurs.8 3 The high premium thus makes the "pill" hard to swallow."
Structural defenses are included in the articles of incorporation or in amend-
ments to the corporate charter by vote of the shareholders. Consequently, a
shareholder derivative suit challenging a structural provision is unlikely to
succeed.8 5 In a derivative suit, one or more shareholders sues on behalf of
the corporation to prevent harm to the corporation and subsequently to him-
self as a shareholder of the corporation. A shareholder's right to bring the
action derives from the shareholder's status as an owner of the corpora-
tion.8 6 Therefore, where a majority of shareholders vote to approve a struc-
tural defense, shareholders limit their right to challenge implementation of
that action.
Financial defenses, such as the so-called "pac man" defense, in which the
target corporation attempts to take over the raider, are initiated by direc-
81. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (corporation
made acquisition in order to create antitrust problems for potential raider), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985) (preferred
purchase rights plan whereby raider's holdings would become diluted).
82. See Green & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 701-06 (1984).
83. A poison pill is a defensive measure usually involving the issuance of "rights" as
dividends on preferred stock that are "triggered" when any one person or group
acquires a certain percentage... of the target corporation's voting stock; the trigger-
ing of the rights allows the holders to buy stock at bargain prices, thus making a
takeover by an outsider "poisonously" expensive.
I Corp. Guide (P-H), supra note 23, 2720a, at 2727 (emphasis in original).
84. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986); see also R. WINTER, M. STUMPF & G. HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 505.
Other examples of "shark repellents" include supermajority provisions and fair price provi-
sions. A supermajority provision requires more than a statutory minimum number of share-
holders to approve a merger or sale of assets. See Note, The Reasonableness of Defensive
Takeover Maneuvers When the Corporate Raider is Mr. T Boone Pickens: Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 739, 752 n.100 (1988). A fair price provision
requires a supermajority vote (for example, 95%) of outstanding shares to approve a merger,
unless shareholders receive the highest price possible when an acquiror is buying shares of the
target. See R. WINTER, M. STUMPF & G. HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 46.
85. See Note, supra note 84, at 751-52.
86. 1 Corp. Guide (P-H), supra note 23, 1551. A shareholder derivative action "is a suit
brought by one or more shareholders to enforce a cause of action belonging to the corpora-
tion." W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 33, at 570 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S.
531, 534 (1970)).
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tors. 8' Generally, financial defenses increase the likelihood of shareholder
derivative suits.8 8 Financial defensive tactics are therefore subject to the en-
hanced business judgment rule.
Although a few court decisions outside of Delaware express a minority
view that courts should not apply the business judgment rule when review-
ing defensive tactics used to thwart hostile takeovers, Delaware courts con-
tinue to apply the rule. 9 The difficulty with the rule in the takeover context
87. See Green & Junewicz, supra note 82, at 701-02.
88. The Sixth Circuit upheld a "pac man" defense in Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
Other examples of financial defenses include "white knight" and "scorched earth" defenses.
A "white knight" is an acquiror either sought out or preferred by management of the target
corporation. See Note, Corporate Takeovers and the Business Judgment Rule: The Second
Circuit Puts Target Corporations on the Auction Block, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 409, 414 n.23
(1987). If the target finds the "raider" unacceptable, it may offer inducements to a white
knight to enter the bidding. Id. A "scorched earth" defense involves the target selling off
valuable assets (crown jewels) that may attract a potential or actual raider in order to reduce
interest in a takeover. Id. at 419 n.48.
89. See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 118-20. The authors cite two
United States Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981), and Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d
Cir. 1980) (applying Delaware law), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981), in which dissenting
judges concluded that the business judgment rule should not apply in such a context. In John-
son, the dissenting judge thought that the burden of proof should shift to the directors upon a
showing by the plaintiff that the directors' desire to retain control was merely one motive (but
not the controlling one) in the transaction. Johnson, 629 F.2d at 301 (Rosenn, J., concurring
and dissenting) (cited in THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 109).
In another case that applied the business judgment rule in finding that the burden shifted to
the directors, one court questioned use of the rule:
The rule was developed to protect directors' judgments on questions of corporate
governance .... Courts have no place substituting their judgments for that of the
directors.
Defensive tactics, however, raise a wholly different set of considerations. The
problem is that defensive tactics often, by their very nature, act as a restraint on
business purposes. Therefore, the application of the business judgment rule in this
context seems, to us, questionable, however, the weight of authority dictates that the
rule be applied....
... The right of a shareholder to sell his stock is a private transaction between a
willing seller and a willing purchaser and in no way implicates the business judgment
rule. Therefore, a board of director's assertion of a unilateral right, under the busi-
ness judgment rule, to act as a surrogate for the shareholder's independent right of
alienation of his stock is troublesome.
Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259-60 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(applying New Jersey law) (quoted in THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE, supra note 3, at 119-
20); see also Johnson & Siegel, supra note 3, at 325 (criticizing use of the business judgment
rule in takeover situations because "inside" directors (those who both occupy management
positions and sit on the board) may reject a bid for reasons of personal financial concerns, job
security, or simple desire to retain control).
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thus remains the struggle to apply it consistently to the issue of whether
directors or shareholders should decide ultimate questions concerning con-
trol of the corporation.
C. Changes in Control and the "Auctioneer" Duty
Since Unocal, Delaware courts have found few defensive tactics unreason-
able, giving rise to concerns that the "enhanced" test is no more protective
of shareholders' interests-in particular, their interest in preventing en-
trenchment of management-than is the traditional business judgment
rule.' In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,9" however,
the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that, in hostile takeover contests,
there can be a point where directors no longer have a legitimate interest in
taking action to preserve the corporate entity. At that point, directors have
a duty to "maximiz[e] ... the company's value at a sale for the stockholders'
benefit.",92 The issue Delaware courts have struggled with in takeover cases
since Revlon is determining when a board has reached that crucial point.
In Revlon, the board of Revlon, Inc., instituted a series of defensive meas-
ures aimed at thwarting an imminent hostile tender offer for Revlon shares
by Pantry Pride, Inc.93 The Revlon directors believed that the Pantry Pride
offer would be inadequate, and that Pantry Pride's directors intended to ac-
quire Revlon and break up the corporation by selling off its assets.94 After
Pantry Pride made a tender offer, Revlon's board rejected the offer and im-
plemented additional defensive measures." Subsequent escalating offers
90. Only three cases have found defensive measures unreasonable in relation to the threat
posed. In City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790-91, 802 (Del. Ch.), appeal
dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the defensive
measures enacted by Interco's board of directors were not reasonable in relation to the threat
posed by a tender offer, but that the defensive measures did not contemplate a sale and thus
did not invoke Revlon duties. The court noted, however, that even though a "merger may be
regarded as a sale," Revlon does not require that an auction occur before there can be a
merger. Id. at 802; see Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988);
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986); see also
Johnson & Siegel, supra note 3, at 229-38 (arguing that, although courts acknowledge that
target directors have a conflict of interest when defending against a hostile takeover, directors
can overcome their burden merely by "devoting time and attention to making the decision" to
reject the offer; thus, "[t]he Unocal test is ... unresponsive to target shareholders' concerns
because it is the directors' loyalty to the corporation, not their care, that is at issue"). But cf
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 256 (arguing that the "proportionality" test of Unocal is
"not an empty threshold test," unlike the "policy conflict/primary purpose" test of the tradi-
tional business judgment rule).
91. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
92. Id. at 182.
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from Pantry Pride ensued.9 6 Following Pantry Pride's second offer, which
the Revlon board also rejected, the board authorized negotiations with other
companies interested in taking over Revlon.97 Revlon's board eventually ap-
proved a sale to Forstmann Little & Co. on terms that included liquidating
some of Revlon's assets to finance the sale.98 The agreement also included a
"lock-up option" which gave Forstmann an option to buy two divisions of
Revlon for a price substantially below their actual value.
99
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that in certain instances involving
takeover negotiations, "the directors' role change[s] from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price.""
The court determined that under the facts of Revlon, the Revlon board's
duty as defender of the corporation changed when it rejected Pantry Pride's
tender offer as inadequate, but then authorized negotiations with other par-
ties.' 0 ' At the point when the Revlon board "recogni[zed] that the company
was for sale" it had a duty to get the best price possible for the company. 1°2
When the Revlon board granted Forstmann a lock-up option, it violated its
duty to maximize share value because the lock-up ended the auction.' 3 The
court stated that the Revlon board's initial defensive measures had the effect
of benefiting Revlon's noteholders at the expense of the shareholders, and
that its later measures, including the lock-up option, primarily served to
shield the directors from liability to the shareholders. " The court therefore
asserted that the Revlon board could not overcome its burden under Uno-
cal's "enhanced scrutiny" by proving that the defensive actions were reason-
able in relation to the threat posed to the corporation by Pantry Pride's
offer. 1
0 5
96. Id. at 177-78.
97. Id. at 177.
98. Id. at 178.
99. Id. "Lock-up options" are structural defenses designed to deter hostile acquirors. See
Nachbar, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.-The Requirement of a Level
Playing Field in Contested Mergers, and its Effect on Lock-ups and Other Bidding Deterrents,
12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 473, 473 n.2 (1987).
100. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
101. Id. at 177, 182.
102. Id. at 182.
103. Id. at 183-84. Lock-ups are not per se illegal. Some options may induce bidders to
seek control, creating an auction in which shareholders will realize maximum value for their
shares. Lock-ups that serve to end the auction, however, hurt the shareholder. See id. at 183;
see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir. 1986)
(court acknowledged that "lock up options" that prevent bidders from competing with the
optionee bidder are harmful to shareholders).
104. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
105. Id. at 183-84.
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Following Revlon, the business judgment rule appeared to protect direc-
tors' actions that prevented the breakup of the corporation, as long as those
actions complied with the standards of Unocal. In the event of an "inevita-
ble" breakup," °6 however, Revlon required that a board become auctioneers
and remain neutral between competing bidders.° 7 Courts have experienced
difficulty applying this test, however, and the extent of directors' liability
under Revlon remains unclear.108
II. THE REVLON STANDARD EXAMINED: WHEN IS A BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN "THE REVLON ZONE"?
No court has defined explicitly when a corporation is "in the Revlon
zone," "for sale," or "contemplating a change in control," phrases employed
in various decisions to indicate the triggering of the directors' auctioneer
duty under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.'09 In Rev-
ion, the court stated that recognition by a board of directors that the com-
pany is for sale triggers a duty to maximize current share value." 0 After
Revlon, decisions addressing change in control issues have determined that
the crucial question is deciding when, during complex corporate transac-
tions, directors reach the point where Revlon duties arise."' These deci-
sions, however, offer no clear guidance to directors as to what events trigger
their auctioneer duties. While some cases indicate some expansion of "the
Revlon zone, '  more recent decisions by the Delaware courts indicate an
unwillingness to apply a more stringent standard than the Unocal enhanced
106. Id. at 182.
107. See Nachbar, supra note 99, at 476-80, 494.
108. Some commentators have urged that management remain completely passive follow-
ing a takeover. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). No court, however, has ac-
cepted this approach. See Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 888 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Guy, J., dissenting).
109. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D.
Del. 1988); Kleinhandler v. Borgia, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,525,
at 93,324 (Del. Ch. July 7, 1989); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,173 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); In re Holly
Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,181, at 91,641 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).
The decisions are clear that after a sale or auction has started, a director's foremost duty is
one of fairness. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del.
1988); In re Holly Farms Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,181, at 91,643 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).
112. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1989); Black & Decker Corp., 682 F. Supp. 772;
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); In re Holly Farms Corp.,
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business judgment rule in situations where directors' and shareholders' inter-
ests conflict." 3
A. Interpretations of Revlon Favoring Directors
Some recent Delaware decisions upholding directors' actions provide well-
defined examples of when Revlon will not apply. In Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 1 4 the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted strictly
the Revlon holding. In Ivanhoe, Ivanhoe Partners and Ivanhoe Acquisition
Corporation (collectively, Ivanhoe), increased its stock holdings in
Newmont Mining Corporation (Newmont) in preparation for a hostile
tender offer." 5 At the time, Newmont was operating under an agreement
with Consolidated Gold Fields PLC (Gold Fields) that required, among
other conditions, that Gold Fields limit its ownership of Newmont to
33.33%, but provided that Gold Fields could terminate the agreement
should a third party acquire at least 9.9% of Newmont's shares." 6
When Ivanhoe increased its ownership to 9.95% in an attempt to compel
Gold Fields to terminate the agreement and negotiate with Ivanhoe in a
takeover of Newmont, Newmont's board enacted defensive measures.
117
The Newmont directors exempted Gold Fields from these measures because
they were uncertain whether Gold Fields intended to remain an ally of
Newmont or intended to attempt a takeover.' Gold Fields thus consti-
tuted a reasonable threat to Newmont." 9 When Newmont's board refused
to meet with representatives of Ivanhoe to negotiate a private sale of
Newmont to Ivanhoe, Ivanhoe made a hostile tender offer for 42% of
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,181, at 91,641 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1988); see infra notes 140-65 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987); Kleinhandler v.
Borgia, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 94,525, at 93,324; see also Mills, 559
A.2d at 1285 n.35:
Clearly not every offer or transaction affecting the corporate structure invokes the
Revlon duties .... Circumstances may dictate that an offer be rebuffed, given the
nature and timing of the offer; its legality, feasibility, and effect on the corporation
and the stockholders; the alternatives available and their effect on the various constit-
uencies, particularly the stockholders; the company's long term strategic plans; and
any special factors bearing on stockholder and public interests.
114. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
115. Id. at 1338.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1339.
119. Id.
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Newmont's shares. 120 Newmont's board rejected that offer and a subsequent
offer as inadequate. 121
Faced with threats from both Ivanhoe and Gold Fields, Newmont's board
developed a plan to thwart Ivanhoe and maintain Newmont's independence.
The plan called for Newmont to sell certain assets, then use the proceeds to
pay a dividend to all shareholders. 12 2 The dividend would allow Gold Fields
to purchase additional shares of Newmont in a "street sweep.' 123 At the
same time, Newmont and Gold Fields would enter into a new agreement
that would allow Gold Fields to own up to 49.9% of Newmont's stock, but
limit Gold Fields' representation to 40% of the board of directors and also
require the board members from Gold Fields to support Newmont's board
nominees. 124 The defensive measures enacted by Newmont's board would
allow it to retain control of the corporation.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that Newmont's board was not subject
to the auctioneer duty imposed by Revlon. ' 25 The court stated that "Revlon
applies ... only if it was apparent that the sale of Newmont was 'inevita-
ble.' ,126 While the court's phraseology takes some liberty with Revlon's
wording, ' 27 the court's reasoning for why it could not find a sale illuminates
the decision. Specifically, the court found that a sale was not inevitable for
two reasons: First, "Newmont was never for sale,"' 28 and second, "there
was neither a bidding contest, nor a sale."' 129 The court held that the divi-
dend, which allowed Gold Fields to "sweep the street" and increase its own-
ership to 49.7%, did not constitute a sale by Newmont to Gold Fields.'
30
Gold Fields was not a bidder, and increased its shareholdings by buying
shares through private sellers rather than directly from Newmont.' 3 ' The
court further held that the Newmont board's actions were reasonable in re-




123. Id. at 1337, 1339-40. A "street sweep" occurs when a buyer purchases shares of tar-
get stock on the open market, normally at a premium, during and immediately after the tender
offer period. Id. at 1337 n.3.
124. Id. at 1340.
125. Id. at 1345.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. In Revlon, the Court held that at the point of "inevitable" breakup, auctioneer duties
take effect. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
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and were not intended to entrench Newmont's management.132 Therefore,
the Delaware Supreme Court was willing to end its analysis of the Revlon
issue based on a finding that no "sale" occurred.
In Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 3 the plaintiff, an individual share-
holder, asserted that the Curtiss-Wright Corporation's board of directors
had a duty to conduct an auction of a subsidiary corporation, rather than
arrange a merger with the subsidiary by buying all of its stock. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that a majority stockholder has no duty to sell its
stock to the highest bidder simply to benefit a minority stockholder. 134 In its
opinion, the court made clear that the subsidiary was not for sale, and thus
Revlon did not apply. 135 Accordingly, the court reasoned that there is no
principle of law that requires a majority shareholder to conduct an auction
when it decides to merge by cashing out the minority. 1
36
Similarly, in Kleinhandler v. Borgia, 13 the plaintiff charged that the board
of directors at Columbia Pictures Industries (Columbia), owner of 42% of
the stock of Walter Reade Organization, Inc. (WRO), had a duty to put
WRO up for auction when the Columbia board decided to acquire all of
WRO's stock in a merger. Following Bershad, the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery rejected the plaintiff's claim as" 'unsupported by any accepted principle
of law.' ,138 The court stated that Revlon duties arise only when the board
decides to sell the corporation to a third party rather than to a majority
stockholder. 1
39
B. Interpretations of Revlon Applying the Auctioneer Duty
The Delaware Court of Chancery interpreted Revlon more expansively in
Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc. "4 In Freedman, the
plaintiffs, shareholders of Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc., sought an
injunction against a leveraged buyout of the company by the manage-
ment. '4 Although the court denied the injunction, it stated that when a
132. Id.
133. 535 A.2d 840 (Del. 1987).
134. Id. at 844-45.
135. Id. at 842 (citing Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1334).
136. Id. at 845.
137. Kleinhandler v. Borgia, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,525, at
93,324 (Del. Ch. July 7, 1989).
138. Id. at 93,326 (quoting Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del.
1987)).
139. Id.
140. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,502, at 97,214 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 16, 1987).
141. Id. at 97,215.
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corporation "is to be subject to a change in control," current share max-
imization under Revlon is required.' 42
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware followed the
Freedman reading of Revlon in Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard,
Inc. 143 There, the court, interpreting Delaware law, stated that "[i]t seems
unreasonable to conclude that the Delaware Supreme Court would limit the
applicability of the duties under Revlon, to only those situations involving
the complete sale of all shares of the company."'
44
In Black & Decker, the board of American Standard, Inc., instituted a
management recapitalization plan that would result in management control-
ling 55% of American Standard's common stock.
145
The American Standard directors conceived and implemented the plan
following a hostile tender offer by Black & Decker Corporation. The court
held that the plan was an "offer to gain control" of the corporation by the
board,'" triggering Revlon duties. Thus, the court concluded, a "transac-
tion which results in a change of control of a corporation amounts to a 'sale'
under Revlon." 1
47
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., ' 41 the Delaware Supreme
Court also expanded the class of situations to which Revlon duties may ap-
ply. Specifically, the court stated that the sale, whether transacted as "an
active auction, a management buyout, or a 'restructuring,' " triggers Revlon
duties.' 49 In an earlier decision,'" 0 the court of chancery enjoined a restruc-
turing plan, holding that "although not a sale of an absolute majority inter-
142. Id. at 97,218.
143. 682 F. Supp. 772, 779 (D. Del. 1988). The defendant board argued that Revlon did
not apply because, under the management recapitalization plan at issue, management would
not gain control. Instead, the public would own 46% of the corporation, management would
own 24%, and an Employee Stock Option Plan would control 30%. In addition, Black &
Decker involved no lock-up, as did Revlon, and the board claimed to have acted to preserve its
independence and to have no intention of selling. Id.
144. Id. at 781. The District Court gave the following rationale for expanding Revlon:
To require that the Revlon principle apply only to an offer to purchase 100% of a
company's stock would ignore the inevitability of a break-up which could follow a
partial tender offer. The effect of a partial tender offer is that "it allows a raider to
gain control of a target and hold a minority interest captive, with little protection for
the stockholder against self-dealing or a squeeze-out merger."
Id. n.4 (quoting Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1986)).
145. Id. at 782.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 781.
148. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
149. Id. at 1285. The court noted that the case did not require the court to determine
precisely when Macmillan was for sale.
150. Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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est, [the plan] does constitute a sale of effective control."'' Early drafts of
the restructuring plan called for more than 50% management ownership.
The board, advised that such a plan could be considered a sale, revised it to
give management less than 50% ownership. This reduction, the court noted,
meant that "the risk of triggering Revlon duties would be reduced if not
eliminated, yet the objective of giving effective control would still be accom-
plished. The change, then, was one of form, not substance ....
In In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 15 3 the Delaware Court
of Chancery found that a stock swap transaction in response to a hostile
tender offer constituted a sale that triggered Revlon duties.'5 4 The court's
decision rejected any suggestion that some members of the target board did
not believe that their actions put the corporation up for sale, or "in play."'' 55
Further, even though the board chose the most attractive option available at
the time, the court found a violation of Revlon duties because the board
ended the opportunity for an auction by implementing a defensive "lock-up
option." 1
5 6
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Sixth Circuits
also have read broadly Revlon's holding.'5 7 In Edelman v. Fruehauf
Corp.,' the Sixth Circuit held that Revlon's holding included mergers.' 59
151. Id. at 1242. The restructuring allowed the board to gain control of one of two newly
created divisions. Id. The court of chancery found the plan inferior to the hostile tender offers
and enjoined the plan because the only threat to the target board was its "incumbency" and
loss of its expectation of a controlling interest under the new plan. Id. at 1246-47.
152. Id. at 1243. The court found that "the restructuring involves a transfer of effective
control that under normal market conditions would command a control premium." Id.
153. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,181, at 91,641 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 30, 1988).
154. Id. at 91,643.
.155. Id. at 91,644. Cf Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del.
1987) (the court appeared to defer to the Newmont board's assertions that no sale of the
company was intended); supra notes 114-32 and accompanying text (discussing the Ivanhoe
decision).
156. In re Holly Farms, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,644-
45. "[L]ock-ups 'which end an active auction and foreclose further bidding operate to the
shareholders' detriment' " and are presumed to violate Revlon. Id. at 91,644 (quoting Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986)).
157. See generally Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986) (lever-
aged buyout by management enjoined where "it appear[ed] that the Board simply decided to
make a deal with management no matter what other bidders might offer"); Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 281 (2d Cir. 1986) (lock-up option enjoined
where board "'knew or should have known'" that it would end bidding (quoting Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F. Supp. 848, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
158. 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 884, 887; see also Johnson & Siegel, supra note 3, at 372 ("all merger[s] ...
inherently involve the sale of the target"). The Ninth Circuit has disagreed with the auction
requirement in a merger context, however. In Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest,
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In Edelman, Fruehauf Corporation's board, following a tender offer, agreed
to form a new company comprised of Fruehauf management and a "white
knight," an acquiror sought out by the board whom the board preferred to
the raider."W After the new company formed, it completed a merger agree-
ment with Fruehauf's board. 161 Finding that Fruehauf had in fact been for
sale, the court extended the proscription against favoring a particular bidder
once the target corporation is for sale to include the management bidding
group. 162 The court held that the directors violated their duty to sharehold-
ers by approving the merger "without fostering a real bidding process." '163
The "auctioneer duty" decisions reveal that directors' duties to sharehold-
ers in a takeover context vary with the facts and circumstances involved in
each case. A defensive tactic that may be reasonable at an early stage of
hostile takeover proceedings may, at a later point, be unreasonable in rela-
tion to the threat and thus violate directors duties under both Unocal and
Revlon. 164 As one court stated, as a "bidding war" escalates, "the transition
from corporate defender to auctioneer becomes inevitable."
' 65
741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984), Jewel entered into a merger agreement with Pay Less Drug
Stores (Pay Less), which prohibited Pay Less from entering into other transactions; subse-
quently, Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest made a tender offer for Pay Less, which the Pay
Less board accepted, and terminated the merger agreement with Jewel. The court found for
Jewel on breach of contract grounds, but stated that California law does not support the auc-
tion theory. Id. at 1557-58, 1560-62.
160. Edelman, 798 F.2d at 884-85.
161. Id. Fruehauf agreed to pay its "white knight," Merrill Lynch, "break-up" and other
fees, and also agreed to a "no-shop" provision.
A break-up fee is paid by a target corporation to a bidder if a proposed transaction or
merger between bidder and target does not take place. See Nachbar, supra note 99, at 485.
A no-shop clause is an agreement by a corporation not to solicit or accept better subsequent
offers, but to deal exclusively with its white knight. See THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE,
supra note 3, at 226.
The Delaware Supreme Court struck down a no-shop provision in Revlon:
Favoritism for a white knight to the total exclusion of a hostile bidder might be
justifiable when the latter's offer adversely affects shareholder interests, but when
bidders made relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes inevita-
ble, the directors cannot fulfil their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with
the contending factions. Market forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the
target's shareholders the best price available for their equity.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
162. Edelman, 798 F.2d at 886. The court indicated that a target's board could use corpo-
rate assets for management buyouts or to encourage bidders only if the board was neutral and
objective in its actions. Id. at 887.
163. Id. at 885. Although the court applied Michigan law, it followed the Michigan courts
in looking to Delaware case law on this issue. See Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 444 (6th
Cir. 1989).
164. See W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, supra note 33, at 488-92.
165. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 847 (D. Minn. 1986) (citing
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181-82), affid in part and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987).
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III. PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. TIME INC.
A. Negotiations Between Time Inc. and Warner Communications
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,'" is among the most re-
cent Delaware decisions that address the issue of when directors are in "the
Revlon zone." In Paramount, the Time board's long-range corporate plan-
ning led the company to conclude that, due to Time's evolution from a focus
on print-oriented communications products to an emphasis on video and
entertainment-oriented products, it should become more vertically inte-
grated. 167 To further this goal and to become more competitive in interna-
tional markets, Time sought ownership opportunities for the production of
the video products it distributed through cable subsidiaries. 168 Time's origi-
nal talks with Warner Communications, after being approached by Warner
in the spring of 1987, centered on possible joint ventures between Time and
Warner.' 69 Between the time of the original Time-Warner talks and July
1988, Time's board of directors determined that a complete merger with
Warner could meet Time's long-term planning goals.' 7° Consequently, at a
board meeting on July 21, 1988, Time's board approved, subject to condi-
tions, merger agreement negotiations.' 7
The chief condition relating to the merger stated that any agreement must
ensure that Time's senior management would ultimately control the result-
ing company. 172 Time's board wanted to preserve the editorial indepen-
dence of the company's magazines. 173 Specifically, the directors believed
that keeping the editorial review structure in place was crucial to ensuring
the journalistic integrity of Time's writers and editors. 174 The board consid-
ered this integrity an asset to the company and its shareholders.' 75 Thus,
166. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
167. See id. at 1143-44. Vertical integration may be defined narrowly as "the union within
one firm of conventionally distinct states of production and distribution." R. POSNER & F.
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 869 (2d ed. 1981). Prior to merging with Warner, Time owned
the Home Box Office (HBO) and Cinemax cable networks and several cable television
franchises, in addition to magazine and book publishing operations.
168. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1143.
169. See Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,267-3 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989) afd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
170. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1144.
171. Id.
172. Id. Some board members, however, believed that the proposed merger could put
Time "in play." Id.
173. Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
93,268.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 93,268-69.
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the directors asserted that preserving editorial independence would help
keep Time financially viable. 1
76
Merger negotiations lasted until March 3, 1989, when the boards of both
companies approved the merger agreement.177 The agreement called for a
twenty-four-member board comprised of twelve incumbent directors from
both Time and Warner. 178 At Warner's insistence, Time agreed that the
merger would take the form of a stock for stock swap.' 79 The ratio ulti-
mately agreed upon was that one share of Warner common stock would
trade for .465 of one share of Time common stock."8 ° Because the market
value ratio of Warner stock to Time stock at that time was roughly .38, the
agreement represented an approximate 12% premium for Warner share-
holders.' Under this agreement, "Warner stockholders would have held
approximately 62% of the common stock [and voting power] of Time-
Warner."1
8 2
The boards of both companies took several steps to protect the merger
agreement. First, the boards signed a Share Exchange Agreement giving
both parties the option to trigger an exchange of shares that would result in
Warner owning 11.1% of Time stock and Time owning 9.4% of Warner
stock.'8 3 In doing so, the boards intended the Share Exchange Agreement
to discourage outside actions that might disrupt the merger.'8 4 Second,
Time paid several banks "dry up" fees in exchange for promises by the banks
not to lend money to any third party interested in acquiring Time.'8 5 The
Time board also agreed not to consider any other merger or acquisition pro-
176. Id. at 93,268.
177. Id. at 93,269-70. Outside directors comprised a majority of both boards. Id. at
93,270. The court found that the agreement was "an arms-length negotiated agreement be-
tween two parties seeking individual advantage through mutual action." Id. Courts generally
look more favorably upon decisions approved by a board with a majority of outside independ-
ent directors. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
178. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Del. 1989). J.
Richard Munro, chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) of Time, and Steven Ross, CEO
of Warner, were to serve as co-CEOs of the merged company until Munro retired in 1990. Id.
Ross agreed to retire five years after the merger, at which point N.J. Nicholas, Time's presi-
dent and chief operating officer, who would succeed Munro at Time, would become the sole
CEO of Time-Warner. Id at 1145.
179. Id. at 1145.
180. Id. at 1146.
181. Id.
182. Id. (footnote omitted). The court pointed out that this percentage does not take into
account the shareholders who owned stock in both Time and Warner. Id. n.7
183. Id. at 1146.
184. Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514, at 93,270 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
185. Id. at 93,270-71.
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posals. "86 Finally, the board included a provision in the merger agreement
that gave Warner the option of getting out of the agreement if the Time
board entered negotiations with a takeover bidder. 1
87
The formal structure of the agreement called for the merger of Warner
into a wholly-owned subsidiary of Time, TW Sub. Inc. Warner would be the
subsidiary's sole holding.' 88  Warner common stock then would be con-
veted into Time common stock as agreed, and the name of Time would be
changed to Time-Warner. '89 This structure required a vote of approval by a
majority of the shareholders of both companies."9° Time's shareholders
were to vote at the company's annual shareholder meeting on June 23,
1989.191
B. Paramount's Tender Offer and Subsequent Negotiations
On June 7, 1989, Paramount Communications, Inc., made a cash tender
offer for Time's stock at $175 per share, a considerable increase over its then-
current trading price of $126 per share.' 92 The offer was subject to numer-
ous conditions, including the termination of the Time-Warner merger and
the Share Exchange Agreements.' 93 Time's board rejected the offer on June
16, 1989, stressing its commitment to a merger with Warner.' 94 The board
stated that Time was not for sale, and that even if it were for sale the offer
would be inadequate. 9 In addition, Time's board believed the conditions
186. Id. at 93,271.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 93,270.
189. Id.
190. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983 & Supp. 1990) requires that the board of direc-
tors of a corporition seeking to merge or consolidate "shall adopt a resolution approving an
agreement of merger or consolidation." Id. This agreement must then "be submitted to the
stockholders of [the] corporation at an annual or special meeting for the purpose of acting on
the agreement." Id. The statute requires a majority of the outstanding voting stock of the
corporation for adoption. Id.
Under Delaware law, only Warner's shareholders needed to approve the merger because
Time's shares technically would remain unaffected. New York Stock Exchange rules, how-
ever, required a vote by Time's shareholders as well. Paramount Communications, [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,270.
191. Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
93,271.
192. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1147.
193. Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
93,271.
194. Id. at 93,272.
195. Id. Time's investment bankers advised that if an aggressor company purchased
Time's shares, adequate share valuation could be as high as $250. Id.
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imposed upon the offer would considerably delay action, and that Para-
mount was not well suited to Time's long-range planning strategies. 96
Realizing, however, that many shareholders, including institutional inves-
tors and other money managers, would prefer immediate cash rather than
wait for possible greater appreciation of their stock following the proposed
merger, Time's board decided to avoid the possibility that its shareholders
might veto the merger agreement. 197 The Time directors first requested that
the New York Stock Exchange waive its requirement that mergers of listed
companies receive stockholder approval, but the Exchange refused.' 98 At
that point, the board decided to scrap the stock swap and acquire Warner in
a leveraged buyout, assuming between $7 billion and $10 billion in debt and
paying $70 per share for 51% of Warner's stock.' 99 Warner's board ap-
proved the revised transaction on June 16, 1989, after Time's board agreed
to complete the merger, unless enjoined."°
On June 23, 1989, Paramount increased its offer for Time stock to $200
per share.20' On June 26, 1989, the Time board rejected the offer, stating
that it believed the merger with Warner offered greater potential. 202 At no
time did the Time and Paramount boards negotiate on any terms of
acquisition.
C Plaintiffs' Revlon and Unocal Arguments
Following the Time board's rejection of Paramount's $200 per share offer,
Paramount and shareholders of Time filed suit against Time seeking to en-
join the Time-Warner combination. 20 3 The shareholder plaintiffs asserted
that the original merger agreement constituted a decision by the Time board
to transfer control of the corporation, thus putting the corporation in the
"Revlon mode. ' ' 2 ' The shareholder plaintiffs based their suit on several ar-
guments. First, they argued that any change in corporate control triggers
the Revlon duties.205 Second, they contended that the exchange ratio giving
196. Id. at 93,273.
197. Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1148 (Del. 1989).
198. Id. The lower court had noted that although Time "seeks to avoid or obscure" the
fact that it wanted to avoid a shareholder vote, its decision to recast the proposed merger
"must be seen as a reaction" to Paramount's offer and its effect on the shareholders. Para-
mount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,274.
199. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1148.
200. Id.
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Warner shareholders 62% of Time-Warner stock constituted an effective
change of control.2°6 Third, they argued that the merger would have pre-
vented Time from considering higher bids, thus denying Time shareholders
the opportunity to realize a premium price for their shares.2" 7 In essence,
the shareholders asserted that the duty to maximize current shareholder
value should accompany the merger even if the merger did not constitute a
change in control.2"'
Paramount based its suit on Unocal.2° Paramount first asserted that
Time's board did not have a reasonable basis for considering Paramount a
threat.2 0 Next, it claimed that the Time board's response to Paramount's
offer was unreasonable because the response prevented Time shareholders
from voting on the original merger agreement and from tendering their
shares to Paramount.2 "
The Delaware Chancery Court denied the application for injunction.
21 2
The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed that decision in a July 1989 oral
decision, and released its written decision in February 1990.
2 13
IV. THE RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF PARAMOUNT
A. The Courts' Holdings in Paramount
The Delaware Court of Chancery's decision did not resolve the issue of
exactly when Revlon duties arise. The court did state, however, that "not
every offer or transaction affecting the corporate structure invokes the Rev-
Ion duties,",2 14 and that "a board may find itself in a Revlon mode without
reaching an express resolve to 'sell' the company. "215 The court went only
so far as to assert that a "transaction that does represent a change in corpo-
rate control" places a board in the Revlon mode.2" 6 The court held that the
206. Id.
207. Id. A change in control premium is the amount over the current market price offered





212. Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514 at 93,284 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989), affid, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
213. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1155.
214. Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514 at 93,279 (quoting Mills Acquisition Corp. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del.
1988)).
215. Id. at 93,279; see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del.
1988).
216. Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
93,279.
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Time-Warner merger agreement did not "contemplate" such a transaction
and thus did not trigger Revlon duties.2t 7
The court of chancery declared that it would look for a change in control
in the actions of the board. "If the appropriate inquiry is whether a change
in control is contemplated," the court stated, "the answer must be sought in
the specific circumstances surrounding the transaction. '2 8 The court indi-
cated that a stock swap, such as that called for in the Time-Warner agree-
ment, could be a transfer of control if Warner were a private company.
219
Because both Time and Warner were public corporations traded in public
markets, however, the court held that "control" ultimately remained with
the public.
220
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the court of chancery's holding on
the Revlon issue. 22 1 The court framed the issue as whether Time, "by enter-
ing into the proposed merger with Warner, put itself up for sale." '222 The
supreme court, however, based its decision on a broader reading of directors'
discretion.223 The court emphasized that Delaware law charges a board of
directors with managing the corporation; this duty includes "the authority
to set a corporate course of action, including time frame, designed to en-
hance corporate profitability., 224 Accordingly, there is no "per se duty to
maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
takeover.,
225
The court opined that generally two situations lead to Revlon duties: One
occurs when a company "initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell
itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the
company"; 221 the other occurs when "a target abandons its long-term strat-
egy and seeks an alternative transaction also involving the breakup of the
company, ' ' 2 in response to a tender offer. The court held that Revlon does
not apply to actions "simply because they might be construed as putting a
corporation either 'in play' or 'up for sale.' ,,228 When the Time directors





221. Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
222. Id. at 1150.
223. Id. at 1154.




228. Id. at 1151.
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breakup of Time Inc. was not "inevitable," and the board had not aban-
doned its strategic plans.22 9 Because no Revlon duties applied, the court
held that "Unocal alone applies to determine whether the business judgment
rule attaches to the revised agreement.
230
The plaintiffs in Paramount also asserted that, because a merger would
have had the effect of precluding a future control premium, the directors'
fiduciary duties required them to immediately seek a control premium
through a sale of the corporation. 23' The court of chancery dismissed this
assertion, stating that to create the auctioneer duty would require an expan-
sion of Revlon by going beyond sales or other change in control transac-
tions.232 Because such a rule would "dramatically restrict the functioning of
the board whenever an offer was made,, 233 the court of chancery determined
that it would judge the board's decision on a reasonableness standard rather
than the narrower Revlon standard. 234 The supreme court addressed this
argument only briefly, stating that the new Time-Warner entity was not so
big that it could not itself be taken over, in which event the shareholders
would realize a premium.235
The Delaware Supreme Court also affirmed the court of chancery's hold-
ing on Paramount's Unocal claims.. The court of chancery found the original
merger agreement protected by the traditional business judgment rule, but
applied the stricter standard of Unocal to the Time board's later decision to
abandon the merger plan in favor of a buyout of Warner.236 The supreme
court agreed with the lower court that Paramount's offer constituted a threat
to Time, and that the Time board's response to that threat was reasonable
under the circumstances.
237
In holding that the Time directors met the Unocal standard, the supreme
court rejected Paramount's assertion that its hostile tender offer represented
a threat only if less valuable than the Time board's merger plan.2 38 The
supreme court stated that Paramount's assertion of what constituted a threat
was too narrow: "The open-ended analysis mandated by Unocal is not in-
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1154.
232. Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,280-81 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), afid, 570 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 93,281.
235. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1151.
236. Paramount Communications, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at
93,282.
237. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1153.
238. Id.
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tended to lead to a simple mathematical exercise: that is, of comparing the
discounted value of Time-Warner's expected trading price at some future
date with Paramount's offer and determining which is the higher."'239 The
court held that under the Unocal standard of review, a court may not "sub-
stitut[e] its judgment as to what is a 'better' deal for that of a corporation's
board of directors," 2" thereby expressly rejecting an approach taken by the
court of chancery in previous decisions.24 The court found that Time's
board showed a reasonable basis for believing that Paramount's offer con-
tained threats to Time's corporate planning beyond the threat of an inade-
quate price.242 The court also found that Time's subsequent decision to buy
Warner was a reasonable response, given Time's long-range business
plans.2 43 Accordingly, the court held that the decision by Time's board was
protected under UnocaL 244
In sum, the plaintiffs in Paramount were unsuccessful because the court
refused to find that the Time board's actions triggered Revlon duties. The
court, emphasizing the directors' intent in structuring the proposed merger
and subsequent restructuring to avoid a shareholder vote, granted the board
the protection of the business judgment rule. The court considered the Para-
mount offer a threat to the corporation but held that the Time board's tender
offer for Warner stock was reasonable in relation to the danger posed by
Paramount's threat.
B. Implications of Paramount
The actual effects upon corporate behavior of the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Paramount have yet to be fully realized, but the potential
impact is significant. The decision has drawn criticism on both legal and
financial grounds, primarily by shareholders who seek to encourage corpo-
rate directors and management to increase the value of the corporation's
stock, rather than to make nebulous "strategic" plans. Such planning, many
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. But see TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,173 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); City Capital Assocs. v.
Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
242. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1153. According to the court, the Time
board's concerns included that shareholders "might elect to tender into Paramount's cash offer
in ignorance or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with
Warner might produce." Id. The court also cited Time's concern over the conditions and
timing of Paramount's offer. Id
243. Id. at 1154.
244. Id
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shareholders believe, allows directors to remain unaccountable for poor
management performance.
The control cases prior to the decision in Paramount indicate that the
Delaware Supreme Court could have found a triggering of Revlon duties in
Paramount. One of the plaintiffs' assertions in Paramount was that the orig-
inal merger agreement was an "implicit decision" to transfer control to
Warner and its shareholders.2 45 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that if the
shareholders approved the merger agreement, Warner's shareholders would
have owned 61% of Time's equity. 2" Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the
Time directors had "entered a Revlon mode" because a change of control
constituted a sale.247 The Delaware Court of Chancery in Freedman and the
Delaware Supreme Court in Mills had affirmed this position.24 The court's
decision in Paramount therefore represents a significant cutting back in the
number of situations in which Revlon duties might arise. Although the con-
templated merger with Warner would not have caused the dissolution of
Time Inc., some change in control would have resulted. Because a merger,
even a defensive one as in Paramount, arguably involves a "sale" due to the
change of control that occurs,249 the pursuit of immediate maximum share
value, as required by Revlon, would have served shareholder interests.
Clearly, the Time board's decision not to negotiate with Paramount hurt
Time's shareholders. Paramount offered $200 per share for Time's stock
when the stock traded for $126. On the day of publication of the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision, seven months after the Chancellor denied the
plaintiffs' injunction, Time Warner stock traded for approximately
$95.75.25o Further, because of the debt assumed by Time to purchase
Warner, few stock analysts believed that the stock would reach the level of
245. Paramount Comms., Inc. v. Time Inc., (1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514 at 93,278 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
246. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1149.
247. Id. at 1150.
248. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); Freedman v.
Restaurant Assocs. Indus., [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,502, at
93,218 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987); infra text accompanying notes 141-42, 148-52.
249. See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 3, at 372 & n.208 (The authors contend that Revlon's
principles apply to both defensive mergers and to uncoerced mergers because the threat of a
hostile takeover can spur directors to consider a defensive, negotiated merger.).
250. Professor Bernard Black of Columbia University Law School stated, " 'If you try to
figure out what long-term values it would take to equal a Paramount offer of $200 or $220 a
share, you would need a tremendous increase in Time stock. There is no way that this is better
for Time shareholders--short term or long term.' " (quoted in the Washington Post, July 15,
1989, at DIO, col. 1.)
The Washington Post's John Crudele noted that:
[F]rom a shareholder point of view, the combination of Time and Warner could go
down in history as one of the worst deals ever .... Arbitrageurs on Wall Street still
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Paramount's offer for some time."5' Although Time Warner expected some
losses as a result of the combination,252 the question remains as to how much
loss a shareholder must absorb simply because a long-term business plan
protects management. Under Paramount, so long as directors follow a stra-
tegic plan, they can refuse to let shareholders decide whether to seek a maxi-
mum return on their investment. "The question of 'long-term' versus 'short-
term' values is largely irrelevant," the Delaware Supreme Court stated in
Paramount, "because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for
a corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed invest-
ment horizon. ' 253 The court thus gave directors broad authority to stand
behind "deliberately conceived corporate plan[s]. ' '254 The court will allow
shareholders to successfully challenge the plan only if there is "clearly no
basis' 255 for the plan to continue.
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount disregards impor-
tant shareholder considerations, including shareholders' interests in increas-
ing the value of their ownership in a corporation. In addition, the decision
disregards conflicts of interest that lead to management entrenchment to the
detriment of the corporation and its shareholders. Courts have recognized
that the risk of directors acting in a self-interested manner is always present
when the transaction affects control. The Time board structured its merger
with Warner to avoid a loss of control by hostile takeover. The board recog-
nized that, in the face of Paramount's tender offer, Time's shareholders
would not approve the merger. A conclusion that the board acted in strict-
est self-interest when it chose to restructure the merger agreement into a
contend that Time's decision not to negotiate with Paramount may have been the
biggest blunder in the history of the takeover business.
Crudele, Was Time Warner Merger a Mistake?, Washington Post, Mar. i1, 1990, at HI5, col.
2.
251. See Crudele, supra note 250, at H 15, col. 1. " 'I didn't think it [Time Warner's trad-
ing price] would get this low .... [F]rom a short-term perspective it's a significant disappoint-
ment for the shareholder.' " Id. (quoting Edward Atorino, an analyst with Salomon Brothers).
" 'I don't have them in the black until 1993,' said James Goss, an analyst at Chicago's Duff &
Phelps." Id. But see U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 5, 1990, at 70, wherein Jack Egan
noted that, despite Time Warner's $10.8 billion debt, the company is "perhaps the most diver-
sified entertainment enterprise around," that it has several valuable assets, and that several
stock analysts are recommending the stock as a bargain. Cf Crovitz, Can Takeover Targets
Just Say No to Stockholders?, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1990, at A19, col. 4 ("Investment bankers
working for Time Warner predicted in August [1989] that [in 1990] the stock would trade in
the $133 to $213 range .... In the longer term, the bankers predicted that by 1993, Time
Warner's shares would go for between $302 and $380").
252. Crovitz, supra note 251, at A19, col. 4.
253. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1150.
254. Id. at 1154.
255. Id.
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leveraged buyout is not unreasonable. Certainly, the court could have found
such action not protected by the business judgment rule by following the
reasoning of prior decisions holding that an action in contemplation of a
change in control invokes Revlon duties. The court also could have deter-
mined that the Time board's decision to avoid a shareholder vote was an
unreasonable response to the Paramount tender offer, which was clearly not
inadequate.
One effect of the decision could be that corporate boards of directors will
entrench their positions by creating long-term plans as defenses against po-
tential hostile takeover attempts. These plans would serve as records of
boards' justifications for rejecting hostile tender offers should they face
suits. 56 The Delaware Supreme Court, however, decided Paramount in
light of the particular facts and circumstances of the case; Time and Warner
conducted extensive investigations and negotiations. Whether courts would
uphold other "strategic plans" to avoid hostile takeovers would depend upon
the details of the plans, although the Paramount court rejected an approach
that would have the court "appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a
long-term versus short-term investment goal for shareholders.
257
In the wake of the Paramount decision other influences may alter direc-
tors' behavior. One example is the decreasing use of hostile takeovers as a
tool for effecting a change in corporate control. The shift away from hostile
takeovers is partly because the broad protection afforded directors to enact
defensive measures reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of hostile take-
overs. It is also because the use of debt financing to acquire a target com-
pany has become an unpopular and unprofitable strategy. Other takeover
strategies, including proxy battles, may replace hostile takeovers.2 " After
Paramount, it remains to be seen whether the Delaware courts will allow
directors broader discretion in fighting other forms of takeover attempts.
V. CONCLUSION
The business judgment rule primarily reflects a policy of judicial deference
to corporate boards of directors. Courts intend for this deference to provide
incentive for directors to pursue profitable courses of business dealings with-
out fear of judicial second-guessing. Directors owe fiduciary duties of loy-
alty and care to the corporation, however, and may not act in conflict with
the corporation's interests. When directors act defensively to avoid loss of
256. See Samuelson, The Entrenching of Management, Washington Post, Aug. 9, 1989, at
A21, col. 2.
257. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1153.
258. See McCartney, New Takeover Tactic: Ballots Instead of Bonds, Washington Post,
Apr. 8, 1990, at HI, col. 1.
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control of the corporation, the rule of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Inc.,
requires that courts apply an enhanced business judgment standard, because
of the increased risk of a conflict of interest.
The Delaware courts have inconsistently applied the enhanced business
judgment rule. Generally, this inconsistent application has favored direc-
tors. By approving the actions of Time's board of directors and holding that
those actions did not satisfy the Revlon change in control test, the Delaware
Supreme Court, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., further
weakened the fragile protection that the business judgment rule provides
shareholders.
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